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The more we study the migration phenomenon the more we 
understand how deep rooted in its understanding is the sentence: 
“countries of destination thought they had let in workers and they 
discovered instead that they had let in human beings*”.
Much attention is paid to the economic effects of migrants in 
countries of destination. But relatively little attention is paid to 
extremely important socio-political and demographic effects. 
Migration and integration policies are, also, evaluated in economic 
terms: do migrants increase welfare costs; do they displace native 
workers; do they favor economic growth etc. European researchers 
have neglected many key aspects of family-related migration, 
lagging behind, in this respect, North American and Latin American 
research (e.g., Boyle 2002; Falicov 2007; Glick 2010).
With this policy brief, we would like to point out the multiple effects 
that foreign workers can have in non-economic areas. In particular, 
we would like to point out that a policy designed to take care, for 
instance, of the elderly through foreign labor can have externalities 
on the marriage market. Hence, a correct evaluation of a policy 
needs to be more comprehensive and to look at all the implications 
of a given decision.
* This sentence is always quoted in all the European countries in the national 
language and likely it refers to the German gastarbeiter  worker program, but 
unfortunately we were not able to find the precise reference.
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1 - Labor market and migrants
Over the last decades, policy makers and economic 
researchers have focused on the effect of migrants in 
the formal  labor market. They paid special attention 
to the potential competitive role of migrants who 
could displace natives in wage or employment, or who 
could complement the native labour force. Research 
has shown that, whereas a certain replacement effect 
in the labor market was found for the lower levels of 
skills and education (Haisken-De New, Zimmermann, 
1995; Venturini and Villosio 2006, Dalla Zuanna and 
Weber 2011;Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Dustmann et 
al. 2013), migrants do not necessarily affect native 
workers’ wages negatively, nor, for that matter, their 
transition from unemployment to employment. A 
few specific cases of competition have been found, 
but in general the aggregate effect of migrant labor 
on native wages was either positive or zero (Borjas, 
et al, 1997; Gavosto et al., 1999; Venturini et al. 2006; 
Borjas 2006; Ottaviano and Peri,2012).  Researchers 
and policy makers have, however, continued to focus 
on immigrant competition in the labor market and 
more detailed migration policies were implemented 
– or, at least, advocated – to select migrants according 
to labor market needs (i.e. open vacancies). A system 
that gives priority to the workers in demand  (a point 
system or such like) was considered more favorable 
and  coherent with  a migration policy aiming to 
favor native and foreign interests together.
Researchers have recently explored the effect 
of migrants (in general women) working as 
housekeepers or as care workers on the labor market 
participation of native women. They found that 
migrant women provide, for native highly-skilled 
working women, the flexibility needed to invest 
more hours in paid work and  reduces their early 
retirement practice  to take care of elderly parents 
(Cortes Tessada,2011; Barone and Mocetti 2010; 
Romiti and Rossi 2011, Farre’, Gonzales, Ortega 
2011). Clearly, this effect is more important in 
countries where welfare is based on the family unit 
as the provider and producer of services – e.g., caring 
for children and elderly relatives, cooking, washing 
clothes, ironing, and cleaning –where men still 
invest  little time in housework and care activities, 
as is shown by the amount of time women  work at 
home (Anzo et al. 2014). These demands become 
even more pressing in the context of a rapidly ageing 
society and with the need for a second income in the 
household for day-to-day expenses.
This strand of research is relevant because it shows 
how labor market choices have implications for family 
organization and give room to a socio-economic 
interpretation. A society that is unable to adjust to 
new service demands by providing them through 
a public or private external supply of services can 
cope with the new demand by reorganizing family 
production and by introducing an additional labor 
force. This additional labor force, external to the 
household, typically integrates or replaces internal 
female work absorbed by paid employment in the 
labour market. 
According to Rumbaut, “The family is perhaps 
the strategic research site for understanding the 
dynamics of immigration flows (legal and illegal) 
and of immigrant adaptation processes as well as 
long-term consequences for sending and especially for 
receiving countries” (Rumbaut 1997, p. 6). Within 
families, gender equality between women and men 
has increased because both partners work in the 
paid labor market, but house and care work is still 
unequally distributed. Men do not seem to adapt to 
the new role of women outside the home and the 
contribution of men to household activities remains 
very limited (Anxo et al. 2014). Migrants, then, do 
not only affect the paid native labor market, but 
also the organization of the  native family, which 
is another type of production unit. Until now, very 
little attention has been devoted to the effects that 
immigration is producing by changing family 
structure and organization.
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2 - Marriage market and migrants:  
a formal view
Migration literature on family formation or union 
dissolution is still inadequate for Europe, and it 
is practically absent for more recent immigration 
countries such as those in southern Europe. Instead, 
new inflows of women first movers may produce 
changes in the previous equilibrium. Let us take a 
formal perspective here.
We can usefully compare the marriage market to 
the labor market. Let us imagine that there are 
goods and services provided in a marriage, e.g., shirt 
ironing, food preparation, company, protection, 
sexual intercourse, and so forth. Within this market, 
there are two types of agents: the first who demands 
marriage services; and the second who provides 
marriage services. In our model, the first are men 
and the second are women. There are admittedly 
limitations to this traditional model. There may be 
cases where women demand and men provide; there 
are same sex couples; but this stylized way of looking 
at marriage should help in depicting the dynamics 
of couples1.
To get marriage services, the demander has to provide 
remuneration R. The higher the remuneration 
needed, the lower the demand. The demand function 
is thus down sloping:
QmsD = Q0 – aR witha, Q0, R >0 [1]
where QmsD are the marriage services demanded, 
which depend on Q0, the level of marriage services 
demanded when the remuneration R is set at 0, and 
a, a propensity to consume marriage services that 
multiplies the remuneration R.
The supply of marriage services, provided by 
1 For a more detailed presentation of the marriage market 
from an economic point of view, see, for instance, Shosha-
na Grossbard-Shechtman 2003. While the author refers to 
a model similar to ours, she did not analyze the effect of 
migration. Imbalances in the marriage market were con-
sidered by Guttemberg and Secord, 1983.
women, increases with the remuneration granted 
by marriage. The decision to abandon single life 
and enter into marriage implies new duties – such 
as ironing, cooking and having sex – that may be 
differently valued by different women, i.e. they have 
different reservation costs1. Hence, some women 
will be ready to enter the marriage market with a 
lower remuneration than others. Indicating with 
b the propensity to offer marriage services, and 
with Q1 the level of marriage services offered when 
the remuneration is set to 0, the total quantity of 
marriages supplied QmsS is equal to:
QmsS = Q1 + bR with  b, R, Q1> 0 [2]
The higher the remuneration, the larger the supply.
The match between supply and demand determines 
the equilibrium level of marriages Qe and the 
equilibrium market remuneration Re. Formally:
Re = (Q0 – Q1) / (a + b) [3]
The demander is not discriminating among 
suppliers, thus he is unable to provide different 
returns for different suppliers, and the market 
defines both the equilibrium return Eo, which implies 
the remuneration Re, and the level of equilibrium 
marriages Qe (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Stylized representation of the marriage 
market
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It is straightforward to extend this stylized 
representation of the marriage market to include 
the dynamics linked to marital dissolution, which 
eventually leaves space for a new union. Within 
this system, we expect that the changing levels of 
equilibrium remuneration facilitate the disruption 
of established couples. We hypothesize that for an 
established match (a marriage), as the aspirations 
of women increase, there is an increase in their 
reservation remuneration: in Figure 1 imagine an 
uplift in the supply Sms, the benefits that some man 
receives from that union become lower than the 
remuneration that they have to provide, thus the 
number of total marriage decreases(<Qe) and the 
remuneration exchanged will be higher (>Re). In 
this changing scenario of costs and opportunities, 
the demander of marriage services – here the man – 
may decide to interrupt the match.
What happens if the suppliers of marriage services 
increase, for instance, following an increase in female 
migration? An increase in suppliers of marriage 
services determines a shift to the right of the supply 
function Sms (S’ms), and thus a new equilibrium 
point E’0 as well as a new remuneration equilibrium 
R’e(Figure 2). This corresponds to an increase in the 
total amount of marriage services to Q’e. The new 
equilibrium remuneration R’e, which is lower than 
that of the previous situation, will not be sufficient 
for some native women with high reservation 
remuneration. Hence, some of them may decide to 
abandon the match, or the male partner may decide 
not to provide such high remuneration, choosing 
a more affordable option. This changed scenario 
implies that the total number of native marriages will 
decline from Qe to Qn. This shift represents marriage 
disruption. Conversely, the difference between Q’e 
and Qe represents new (mixed) matches.
Figure 2. Stylized representation of the 
marriagemarket following increased female 
migration.
Note that in Figure 2 foreign women hold the same 
reservation remuneration distribution as native 
women, thus the new supply function of marriage 
services S’ms has the same slope as the previous 
one. Nevertheless, the reservation remuneration of 
foreign women might be more accurately set at a 
lower level than that of the native women, because 
they are more in need of remuneration. In this case, 
the new supply function will be steeper, the reduction 
of the equilibrium remuneration larger, and the 
displacement of native women in the marriage 
market even greater.
3– Marriage market and union 
formation
Migration has expanded the options in the marriage 
market. In general, migration has a first wave of 
single migrant men and women, then the family 
member are reunified and the community become 
more balanced. In the initial phase mixed marriage 
are inevitable, after some years they decline, and 
catch up again with the second generation (Paterno 
and Gabrielli 2015). The recent increase in migrant 
women has changed the pattern of assortative 
mating and the marriage market equilibrium in Italy, 
enlarging the possibilities of choice and creating 
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opportunities for men previously excluded from the 
marriage market (Maffioli, Paterno, and Gabrielli, 
2014). 
Recalling Fig.2 this imply the increase of total 
marriage from Qe  to Qe’ as migration increase. 
Consequently, most research on intermarriage 
focuses on the societal, structural and individual 
factors that encourage immigrants to marry outside 
their group (Pagnini and Morgan 1990; Qian and 
Lichter 2001; Jacobs and Labov 2002, Paterno and 
Gabrielli 2015), while limited attention has been 
devoted to the factors that make natives marry 
outside their group (Glowsky 2007). Overall, if the 
female supply increases, men who were not able to 
find a partner are more likely to find one. At the 
same time, if this supply increases, the remuneration 
of the marriage decreases, and some native women 
may decide to leave the marriage market altogether.
The question is whether, say, native men who might 
be unattractive partners in the internal marriage 
market, or might seek a spouse with a traditional 
gender-role vision of marriage, could turn to 
foreign brides. In addition, for some foreign women 
marrying a native represents a social upgrade in the 
destination country, not least for the legal rights that 
are acquired. It is likely that, compared to immigrant 
women, immigrant men are less likely to possess 
characteristics that make them potential candidates 
for marriage, such as an adequate social position 
(Maffioli et al., 2014). In the model presented above 
in Figure 2 the increase number of marriages, after 
a shift of the supply due to migration, implies also 
a reduction of the remuneration provided to the 
mate, which is in line with the hypothesis that less 
attractive male are able to find a partner. 
Educational attainment is a well-established marker 
of labor market status and prospects. Men with low 
levels of education will be more exposed to the risk 
of experiencing unemployment, being altogether 
less desirable in the national marriage market. On 
the other hand, these same men will have a more 
traditional gender-role vision on marriage than 
better-educated men. Less well-educated men may, 
then, be looking for a partner who is willing to 
accept a more traditionally oriented family model. 
They can overcome this obstacle marrying a foreign 
woman who find them attractive and/or share the 
same traditional views on marriage (Sarret and 
Vitali 2015).
A recent study of Sarret and Vitali (2015) analyzes 
intermarriage from the native’s perspective in Spain 
and Italy, two countries of recent immigration that 
share many social and demographic characteristics. 
It used data from the official registers of marriages 
provided by the Italian and Spanish National 
Statistical Institutes on all marriages celebrated in 
the two countries during the period 1998-2010. Of 
all marriages celebrated in Italy and Spain at the end 
of the 2000s, respectively 10% and 15% were mixed 
marriages. Their results show that intermarriage is 
becoming a real option for men and women, some 
of whom may not be “attractive” partners on the 
native marriage market because of low educational 
attainment. In other words, the increase in supply 
of women on the marriage market, thanks to the 
increasing number of foreign women, promotes 
mixed marriages as in the model presented in the 
previous section. Italian and Spanish men with lower 
education, who have more difficulties in finding a 
native partner, may discover in women – especially 
those coming from Eastern Europe and Central and 
South America – a solution to their problem. Thus, 
these findings suggest that intermarriage can be seen 
as a response to the difficulties of finding partners on 
the national marriage market. Paterno and Gabrielli 
(2015) note that exogamy is more pronounced in 
Italy among Italian men: 82% of mixed couples 
have a foreign female; only 18% a foreign man. The 
reasons for this are many, but they mainly stem from 
preferences and religion; e.g., Muslim women should 
only marry Muslim men.
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4 – Marriage market and union 
dissolution
We extend this reasoning in order to include the 
dynamics of marital dissolution. Men may see a 
reduction in incentives and stimuli to continue the 
marriage, especially when the possibility of a “more 
advantageous match” appears on the horizon. Within 
this system, we expect that the increasing presence 
of female migrants facilitates the union disruption 
of established couples. The issue is whether the 
size and the composition of the female migrant 
population in a certain area affects the dissolution 
risk of established marriages.
A recent paper tested this hypothesis in a male-
breadwinner, new immigration country, where 
family-related behavior is changing rapidly, Italy 
(Vignoli, Venturini and Pirani 2015). Migration 
toward Italy is relatively new; it became important 
in the 1970s, with the arrival of several hundred 
thousand migrants, mainly men coming from nearby 
Mediterranean countries. During the first decade 
of the new century, these figures have increased 
exponentially, and most recent data indicate the 
presence of more than 4.5 million migrants legally 
residing in Italy in 2011 (Istat 2012). In recent years, 
Italy has become a privileged destination for women, 
arriving for both family reunification reasons and as 
first movers. The increase in women first movers 
and their entrance for working reasons is explained 
by the growing demand for family services, in 
particular for the care of elderly and sick relatives. 
This sector has faced a meaningful expansion over 
the last decades, because in Italy the state welfare is 
delegated to the family, which serves as the primary 
social safety net (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000). The case 
of women’s migration toward Italy offers a crucial 
example of the double meaning of the “feminization 
of migration”. Feminization refers to the increase in 
the quantity of women who migrate; it points, too, to 
the transformation of female transnational mobility 
from women moving for family reunification to 
first mover single women looking for a job (Di 
Bartolomeo and Marchetti, 2013; Strozza, Paterno, 
Bernardi, and Gabrielli, 2013).
Research has noted that divorce rates tend to be 
higher when there is a surplus of marriageable 
women (Grossbard-Shechtman 1993). Migration 
often brings just such a surplus women, and these 
women may be a factor in the breakdown of native 
marriages. In line with the theoretical model 
Table 1. Effects of regional migration indicators on marital separation. Results of Discrete-time event-history 











Share of female resident foreigners (a, b, c) over total 
resident population
     a. total stock 0.015 0.045
     b. from some countries of Central-South America 0.362 0.053
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presented in Section 2, Vignoli, Venturini and Pirani 
(2015) – using data coming from the Italian Family 
and Social Subjects survey, carried out by the Italian 
National Statistical Office in 2009 – showed that 
by controlling both for individual and contextual 
variables the higher the foreign female presence 
in a certain area, the higher the dissolution risk of 
established marriages2. Not only the size, but also the 
composition of migration matters then as Table 1. 
These outcomes suggest that the increasing presence 
of women first movers (especially those coming from 
Central and South America and Eastern Europe) is 
associated with increasing separation risks.
5 – Concluding remarks
The effect of migration on the marriage market is 
not considered by migration research, which focuses 
mainly on the labor market effect of additional 
workers but forgets additional important implication 
of the migration policy. The large debate on the cost 
of migration for the destination country leave out, all 
too often, the positive effect of new union formation. 
We would recommend considering the increasing 
foreign presence as a potential motor in the evolution 
of the family, at least for Italy. 
The key contribution of our research brief is a 
new perspective on union dynamics, based on 
the characteristics of the natives, but also on the 
potential role of migrants. This perspective allows 
us to ask to what extent intermarriage should be 
considered as a substitute for marrying someone 
from the spouse’s own group by individuals who 
are less valuable on the marriage market because 
of their socio-demographic characteristics. At the 
same time, we would suggest that the size and the 
characteristics of the migrant population affect the 
total number of mixed marriages and the dissolution 
risk of established marriages.
Migration policy rarely distinguishes between 
2  The methodology adopted is cross-section time series.
labor migration and family-related migration: yet 
these findings suggest that there are important 
considerations here. The second is seen as part of 
the family formation process, while the first seems 
to affect only the labor market. Our research has 
shown, instead, that labor migrants affect the 
marriage market because they play an important 
role in the organization, creation and survival of 
the family. Labor migrants support the family unit 
by producing services, contribute to the creation of 
new (mixed) unions and may favor the dissolution 
of natives’ marriages, especially among low educated 
individuals.
We conclude that more reflection and more research 
is needed on the study of partnership dynamics in 
recent immigration countries. The role of migration 
can no longer be disregarded as its represents a key 
factor in shaping natives’ family life. Hence, the 
evaluation of the most appropriate instruments for 
the migration policy cannot be focused on the labor 
market profiles of migrants alone. 
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